This is the first installment of a two-part commentary on the New Brandeis School (the "New Brandeisians") in Antitrust. In this first part, I examine why the New Brandeisians are correct to reject the consumer welfare standard.
Introduction
Barry Lynn's 2010 book, Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction, was one of the first to challenge the current antitrust orthodoxy. According to Lynn, there are two competing antitrust traditions, one personified by Judge Bork that embraced the "Chicago School" of economics, and a second tradition that is encapsulated in the work of Louis Brandeis. Since publication of Lynn's book, there has been an avalanche of literature critical of the Chicago School and advocating more active antitrust enforcement. 1 This movement has come to be known as the New Brandeis School or the New Brandeisians. 2 The
New Brandeisians has emphasized two major themes. First, Robert Bork's goal of consumer welfare has led antitrust jurisprudence astray and has resulted in misguided policy that has done economic damage to the American economy.
3 Second, the New Brandeisians believe that the kind of aggressive antitrust enforcement reminiscent of the 1960s could be a potent remedy to many of these problems. I address the New Brandeisians' rejection of Judge Bork's consumer welfare goal in this paper, and reserve my discussion of the New Brandeisian views of policy and history for a comparison paper. Below, I argue that Judge Bork's introduction of his version of welfare economics into antitrust was theoretically flawed and never should have received the uncritical acceptance by antitrust lawyers and economists. I contend that the consumer welfare standard was never rigorous, and this provides an additional foundation for jettisoning the Bork consumer welfare standard.
In 1966, Robert Bork introduced the consumer welfare standard for antitrust article in the Journal of Law and Economics. There he argued the United States Congress in 1890 "intended the courts to implement (that is, to take into account in the decision of cases) only that value we would today call consumer welfare." 4 Judge
Bork's article and subsequent writings on the topic transformed the contemporaneous and subsequent long running debate concerning the goals of the antitrust laws. At the time of Judge Bork's paper there were several accepted competing goals for antitrust. These goals included defense of democracy by dispersion of economic power, 5 protection of small business, 6 wealth transfers, 7 and productivity. 8 Judge Bork's suggestion was unique in a critical respect. 9 For many of these non-consumer welfare goals one can pose the further question why is the goal itself important. For example, why is small business important? Why does consumer wealth transfer matter? 10 Since consumer welfare is built on the foundations of normative welfare economics, it incorporates its own ethical justification. The other goals do not. This difference added persuasiveness and a veneer of science to the consumer welfare standard. Welfare refers to the quality of individual lives as subjectively experienced by the individuals themselves. Increasing the quality of human life is inherently ethically desirable. This advantage alone doesn't explain the legal and political success of the consumer welfare standard. Its success has many causes. 11 However, it is possible that the perception that Judge Bork's suggestion is rooted in a deeper theory of welfare economics backed by the economics profession helped to crowd out the other potential goals of antitrust enforcement. 12 As early as 1979, Robert Pitofsky wrote that: (May 30, 2002) . Michael Porter's focuses on the importance of competition to productivity growth has been surprisingly ignored by the literature on the goals of antitrust. Indeed, there is a developing literature in development economics which recognizes the importance of competition to development and growth. Joe Studwell, for example, paints a persuasive case that one of the essential ingredients of the success growth of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China has government efforts to expose leading firms to both domestic and international competition. JOE STUDWELL, HOW ASIA WORKS SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN THE WORLD'S MOST DYNAMIC REGION, Grove Press (2013) . See also Joe Brodley, "The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare and Technological Progress," 62 N.Y.U.L.R. 1020 (1987) ("antitrust policy should give priority to innovation and production efficiency"). 9 Judge Bork uses the term consumer welfare and economic efficiency interchangeable. 10 Although democracy may be defended as an end in itself, using antitrust as a means to that end has been criticized. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, (24 October 2017) at 29 ("I do not see that antitrust can do a great deal to solve the deep problems we face relating to the political power of large corporations and corruption of our political system."). 11 I plan to argue in a subsequent paper that Judge Bork's approach received such acceptance because of its compatibility with the general rise of "neo-liberal" economic policies in the United States. There probably has never been a period comparable to the last decade, however, when antitrust economics and lawyers had such success in persuading the courts to adopt an exclusively economic approach to antitrust questions. 13 There is nearly a one hundred year history of economic literature and debate in welfare economics, including work by many of the giants of the economics field: Alfred Marshall, Arthur Pigou, Vilfredo Pareto, John Hicks, Nicholas Kaldor, Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow and many others. What emerged from this literature, among other things, was the recognition of the limitations and assumptions necessary in order to sustain a plausible theory of welfare economics. I call this recognition the "wisdom" of the founders of welfare economics. It is this wisdom that Judge Bork jettisoned when he imported into antitrust law his concept of "consumer welfare." Indeed, Judge Bork's explanation consumer welfare is only an ideological caricature of the original theory.
14 My hypothesis is that in light of this "wisdom," consumer welfare must be rejected as a viable goal for antitrust enforcement.
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In this paper, I do not advance any new theoretical results. Instead, I present the welfare economics literature, and other social science literature on welfare economics, in an historical context, without mathematics and with a minimum tables and figures. My goal is to illustrate to antitrust lawyers how defective and inappropriate consumer welfare is as an antitrust policy goal. To be clear, this paper is not criticizing, or even addressing, positive economic analysis. 16 Cir. 1990 ) (purpose of the antitrust law is the promotion of consumer welfare); Ginzburg v. Mem'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (Same). 14 This is an example of Frank Ackerman's observation that "there is a growing disconnect between advanced academic and pedestrian policy-oriented styles of economics. Understanding public policy debates therefore requires looking back into the origins of the field. FRANK ACKERMAN, WORST CASE ECONOMICS, Anthem Press (2017) at 5. 15 Others are in agreement with this assessment. John Chipman and James Moore, "The New Welfare Economics 1939 Economics -1974 ," 19 INT. ECON. REV. 547, 548 (1978) ("the New Welfare Economics must be considered a failure"); Antoinette Baujard, "A utility reading for the history of welfare economics," UNIVERSITE DE LYON (December 3, 2014), at 2 ("welfare economics has evolved towards an inability or difficulty to provide sound prescriptions").
in the industrial organization field has led to enormous advances in our understanding and measurement of antitrust issues that are important for the antitrust bar. But the opposite is true of the antitrust profession's acceptance of the consumer welfare goal. Consumer welfare has been damaging to antitrust analysis and has unduly circumscribed how advances in our understanding of the economy can be translated into competition policy. 17 Thus, in what follows it is important to separate the theory of welfare economics from microeconomics generally.
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I. A Short History of Welfare Economics for Antitrust Lawyers
According to Judge Bork, "one of the uses of history is to free us of a falsely imagined past. The less we know of how ideas actually took root and grew, the more apt we are to accept them unquestionably, as inevitable features of the world in which we move."
19 These words were written by Judge Bork in his introduction to the history of antitrust cases and the legislative history of the Sherman Act. Despite his advocacy of history, Judge Bork appears unaware of the theoretical history of the concept that he introduces as the sole goal of the Sherman Act, consumer welfare. In this section I briefly trace the milestone events and debates in the field of welfare economics. This history shows that, far from being a settled area of theory, welfare economics is, and always has been, a domain of serious debate and disagreement. As such, it should never have been characterized as an accepted and validated theory appropriate to serve as the sole policy goal of the antitrust laws.
A. The Classical Economists
No welfare economics was possible in the framework of the classical economics of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. The classical economists were focused on long-run prices, or prices that give rise to an equalized rate of profit between markets. The mechanism by which this equalization occurred was entry and exit of firms. If one market yielded an above average return on investment (or rate of profit) firms would enter, which would increase supply in that market (with less impact on demand) which in turn would lower prices. These lower prices, in turn, reduce the return from investment in this market moving the profit rate toward the average. Thus, the classical theory of price determination was based on entry and exit of firms responding to differential profit rates, and the cost of production, which determined profits. The classical economists also adhered to a labor theory of value, because they assumed that labor cost ultimately governed changes in the cost of production. However, absent from the classical economists was any explicit normative theory. Although the classical sometimes spoke as if people could be made better off in some sense through voluntarily trade, this was not a core concept in classical theory. For the classical economists, normative theory needed to be imported from outside of economic theory.
At the same time that the classical economists were developing their economics, Jeremy Bentham introduced the "utilitarian revolution" in the philosophy of ethics. Bentham's fundamental axiom was called the "greatest happiness principle" or the "principle of utility." Bentham reduced utility to net happiness defined as total pleasure minus total pain, and his conception of utility is often referred to as the "hedonic" view of utility. Moreover, utility as conceived by Bentham was measurable on a real number scale. Utility that can be measured this way is referred to as "cardinal" utility. Using cardinal utility, Bentham thought that individual utilities could be summed to obtain the total social utility. Bentham then hypothesized that the policy that yielded the greatest total social utility was normatively superior.
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John Stuart Mill's work illustrates how the classical economics separated normative theory from positive economic theory. John Stuart Mill's Principles of 20 According to Bentham, "it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong", quoted in ALESSANDRO RONCAGLIA, THE WEALTH OF IDEAS, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT, Cambridge U.P (2005) at 175.
Political Economy (the "Principles"), published in 1848, was considered the leading textbook in economics at the time. In the Principles, Mill advanced a theory of prices based on the classical theory of cost of production. But Mill was also a devoted utilitarian and follower of Bentham, and he was a potent advocate for public policy based on utilitarian principles. Thus, Mill used separate theories for his normative policy judgments and those he used for analyzing economic phenomena.
The Neoclassical Revolution in Economics
It was the neoclassical revolution in economics begun by William Jevons, Leon Walras and Carl Menger in the 1870s that placed utility at the center of microeconomic theory. 21 The neoclassicals represented a major theoretical break from the classical tradition. At the heart of the theory of price determination they replaced the concept of cost of production with the concept of utility. The neoclassical object of analysis also shifted from analysis of long-run prices with equalized rates of profit, to short-run equilibrium prices where supply is equal to demand and markets clear.
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For the neoclassicals, demand and supply were determined by individuals making utility maximizing choices about what to purchase and how much labor to supply. For example, demand was conceived of as the money representation of marginal utility, or the utility the consumer receives for the last unit consumed (what Jevons called the "final degree of utility"). 23 Supply depended on producers comparing the disutility of work with the utility gained by the remuneration from such work. The early neoclassicals treated "utility" as an unproblematic concept. But they were equivocal about whether utility should be understood in the hedonic sense of Bentham, or whether utility was simply a measurement of satisfaction linked to the consumption of goods and services. 24 ambiguous. Jevons seemed to suggest that utility was measurable through observation of human decisions but he never explained how such measurement could be undertaken.
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B. Alfred Marshall and Consumer Surplus
In 1890 Alfred Marshall introduced English speaking audiences to the concept of consumer's surplus, which is what today most antitrust scholars mean by "consumer welfare." The year 1890 is the same year that the Sherman Act was signed into law and after the conclusion of the debates in Congress from which Judge Bork gleans congressional intent to adopt consumer welfare as the goal of the Sherman Act.
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Marshall held the prestigious chair of political Economy at Cambridge University. His Principles of Economics ("Marshall's Principles") published in 1890 replaced Mill's Principles as the leading textbook on economics, and it remained so for many subsequent decades. In the Marshall's Principles, Marshall sought to couple the neoclassical theory of demand with a theory of cost that determined supply. While, he recognized the complexity and interrelationships between markets he advocated consideration of each market separately, a technique referred to as "partial equilibrium." In the Marshall's Principles, Marshall also introduced the important concept of consumer's surplus that Judge Bork later equates with consumer welfare in the Antitrust Paradox. Marshall defined consumer's surplus as follows:
The excess of price which he (a consumer) would be willing to pay rather than go without the thing, over that which he actually does pay, is the economic measure of this surplus satisfaction. It may be called consumer's surplus.
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For Marshall, the "economic measure" of "satisfaction" is expressed in monetary units of utility. Like Jevons, Marshall assumed that the amount of money that a consumer is willing to pay for a particular quantity of a good directly expressed the marginal utility the consumer obtains from consuming the good. The difference between the marginal utility of each unit of a good expressed in dollars and the 26 Understanding Marshall's assumptions is critical for evaluating whether consumer's surplus is a reliable basis for antitrust law. It is also important for understanding why most economists after Marshall did not adopt consumer surplus as a guiding principle and instead migrated to the theory of Pareto Optimality. For these reasons, we consider Marshall's assumptions in more detail.
1.
What is utility?
Early on in the Principles, Marshall signaled his break with the hedonic conception of utility by stating that "utility is taken to be correlative to Desire In economic theory, utility is fundamentally a number that represents the amount of satisfaction obtained by an economic agent. It is important to distinguish between two types of number scales that have been used in economics to represent utility. Our usual notion of the natural numbers or counting numbers, which includes a zero starting point, are the "cardinal numbers." Cardinal utility is utility that can be represented on the cardinal number scale. In contrast, "ordinal numbers" are numbers that only embody information about the position of something. When utility is measured in ordinal numbers all we can infer from market choices is whether someone prefers one good to another, but not by how much. 36 The utility numbers themselves do inform concerning the size of the difference in preferences between good. To illustrate the difference between cardinal and ordinal utility consider the utility numbers displayed in Table 1 . Table 1 presents total cumulative utility numbers for consumers A and B. Notice that both consumers receive less additional utility as they consume more of the product. This is referred to by Marshall as "diminishing marginal utility" and is the result of the fact that people have a hierarchy of needs or wants. Cardinality is not required for diminishing marginal utility, but pure ordinality is not compatible with the assumption. The assumption arises because people are assumed to satisfy the most pressing want first. Addressing these pressing wants results in greater satisfaction than addressing lower level wants. Now compare ordinal utility across individuals in Table 1 . For individual A, unit 1 produces 5 units of utility, for individual B, unit 1 provides 50 units of utility. If we have a cardinal scale then we can conclude that individual B gets ten times as much utility as individual A for unit 1. As a consequence, it makes sense to add the two numbers. By adding them we obtain the market utility, i.e., participants obtain utility of 55 units for unit 1, 99 units of utility for unit 2, etc. If the numbers are only ordinal, then we cannot construct the market utility. This is because we cannot assume that that individual A's 5 units of utility are one tenth as much satisfaction as individual B's 50 units of utility for the first unit. All we can discern from ordinal utility is that individual A gets more utility from the first unit, then from the second, but not how much. In addition, since ordinal numbers only represent order, we cannot sum individual A's utility and individual B's utility. If we try to do so, say for unit 1, and obtain 55 units of utility, we get a meaningless number because a 50 for individual B could mean very little satisfaction while 5 units for individual A could represent massive satisfaction. We simply lack the information to compare the two individuals. Adding ordinal utilities together therefore yields no information about human satisfaction or welfare. This is why economists recognize that interpersonal comparisons of utility are not possible using ordinal utility.
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Utility is only a useful concept for antitrust analysis if it can extended to markets. This requires adding together individual utilities of market participants. Thus, antitrust analysis requires either cardinal utility or another method to sum individual utilities. Since no such method exists, utility is a hollow concept for antitrust purposes. Indeed, the economics profession is virtually unanimous that there is no scientific way to observe cardinal utility from market behavior. 38 Even
Jevons, in a moment of candor, recognized this problem:
The reader will find…that there is never, in any single instance, an attempt made to compare the amount of feeling in one mind with that in another. I see no means by which such comparison can be accomplished.
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Interpersonal comparability is therefore a major challenge for welfare economics, and a realistic solution is required for welfare to be applicable to antitrust analysis. Several attempts to retain only ordinal utility but achieve interpersonal comparability are considered below in their historical context. All these attempts have had disappointing results.
The Marginal Utility of Money
When we observe someone's willingness to pay for a good or service, that payment is in units of money, e.g., dollars. We do not directly observe how many units of utility an individual expects to receive. Since money is the intermediary between the observed choices and the measurement of utility, we need to know how many units of utility is represented by a dollar for each consumer. If this relationship is a constant, and is the same for all consumers, the fact that there is a monetary intermediary does not pose any problems. However, Marshall's intuition (and common sense) was that a rich person will value a dollar less than a poor person because the rich have more dollars, and, like other commodities, there is marginal diminishing marginal utility. Indeed, if this were not the case, then financial economics would be upended. A declining marginal utility from additions in wealth is a necessary condition for the phenomenon of risk aversion. Risk aversion means that people experience more disutility when their wealth declines in value than they gain in utility when their wealth rises by an equal amount. That is the reason why people demand a higher average return to hold assets that have a high variance in return, which is a measure of asset risk. 40 Thus if you purchase bonds, you unconsciously must reject the assumption of a constant marginal utility of money. Marshall skirted this problem by arguing that consumer's surplus only applies to a product that is sold equally across income classes. But this is not the case with most goods, and is a severely limiting assumption for antitrust analysis. In the alternative, economists often assume that the marginal utility of money is constant. 40 However, a declining marginal utility of money may not be fully able to explain the risk premium of stocks over bonds. This is called the "equity premium puzzle," and several other theories of the risk premium have been proposed. FRANK ACKERMAN, WORST-CASE ECONOMICS, Anthem Press (2017) at 134-137 (describing various proposed solutions to the equity premium puzzle).
simplification, if a rich person is willing to pay more than a poor person, we are forced to conclude that more total utility is obtained when the good or service accrues to the high income person. Peter Hammond offers an example meant to surface the lack of realism of such a conclusion:
Yet it hardly requires a very strong sense of moral compassion to regard the dollar a destitute mother needs for medicine to save her dying child as definitely more valuable than the extra dollar an opulent man wants to spend on a better quality cigar.
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Again, no economists that I am aware of would contend that a constant marginal utility of money is a realistic assumption. 42 But antitrust practitioners regularly implicitly accept the assumption. Although Marshall made the assumption of a constant marginal utility of money, he did so openly and acknowledged its lack of realism. In contrast, Judge Bork buried the problem.
Partial Equilibrium
Marshall believed that because of the complexity of economic reality, the correct scientific approach was to consider each market independent of the influence of other markets. It is likely the case that many of the advances in positive economic theory, such as oligopoly theory, information economics, monopolistic competition, and many other areas would not have been possible if economists were restricted to general equilibrium approaches. However, Marshall was also aware that when prices go up in one market, it impacts the demand for complements and substitutes in other markets. 43 For example, if a market is monopolized and prices are increased, some consumers will switch between substitutes and purchase fewer complements. The problem posed by the assumption of partial equilibrium for antitrust is the problem Partial equilibrium analysis remains a powerful methodology for analyzing the behavior of firms in an isolate market where the impact on prices in other markets is negligible. And yet this is hardly the case with interesting instances of monopoly power, e.g., AT&T, IBM and Microsoft. In all these cases, prices were affected well beyond the immediate markets, and the static one-sector model cannot correctly estimate the social cost of monopoly.").
of the second best. The second best theory states that if there are deviations from competition in several markets, then restoring competition in one market, may not increase total welfare. This is because the monopoly price in one market may be preventing additional dead weight losses in other markets. For example, consider the situation depicted in Table 2 : Table 2 Butter Monopoly
Margarine Monopoly
Competitive Margarine
In this example, the cost of butter is less than the cost of margarine. When both products are monopolized, more consumers will be driven by the lower price of butter to choose butter, which has a lower cost. This would also be true if both products were competitive and price was equal to cost. But when only the margarine market is rendered competitive, and the butter market remains monopolized, people are driven by relative prices to buy the higher cost product. This is inefficient. Notice it was the monopolization of the margarine market that prevented this distortion. To eliminate the distortion altogether both markets must be made competitive. 44 Because we never have a full informational model of the economy, the theory of second best eliminates any ability to evaluate policy in the presence of market distortions. This exposes a serious dilemma for antitrust policy.
C. Pigou and Wealth Maximization
Marshall's assumptions were met with strong skepticism by the economics profession when Marshall's Principles was published. In reaction to Marshall, Vilferdo Pareto sought to develop welfare economics in the direction of a general equilibrium model strictly limited to ordinal utility and with no interpersonal comparability of utility. ("The second-best theory says that when there is a distortion in one market so that the first-best welfare conditions are not met, and given that this distortion may not be removed, the welfare maximum requires an optimal distortion in other markets rather than the first-best conditions in these markets").
"Pareto principle." While the economics profession was turning its attention to Pareto's work (discussed below), Marshall's student Arthur Pigou, who later succeeded to the chair of the Cambridge Economics Department, published The Economics of Welfare in 1920. Pigou's book retained cardinal utility but its analysis foreshadowed many of the debates about welfare economics that were to occur in future decades. Pigou was specifically interested in what practically could be done to increase social welfare. He began by defining economic welfare as only that part of total human welfare that "can be brought directly or indirectly into relation with the measuring rod of money. This part of welfare may be called economic welfare." 45 Pigou next considered whether increases in the national dividend (Marshall's name for GDP or wealth in Judge Bork's parlance) necessarily increase welfare, and if so, under what conditions. This is a question of current relevance, since Judge Bork, and others in the law and economics tradition, equate increases in total wealth (that is the total quantities of goods and services multiplied by current prices) with increases in total welfare. 46 Pigou demonstrated that changes in wealth and changes in welfare can move in opposite directions. To understand Pigou's argument, consider an economy composed of only one commodity, potatoes. If the economy consists of only one homogeneous good than an increase in wealth will be coextensive with an increase in welfare. In this case, greater wealth means more potatoes, and if no adverse distributional changes are imposed, there will be unambiguously greater total welfare. Things get more complex when the economy consists of numerous products, some of which increase and some decrease each year. 47 Pigou showed that with many goods, GDP and welfare can move in different directions, because changes in prices impact real distribution which, in turn, can impact welfare. For example, suppose there are rich consumers and poor consumers in an economy. The rich buy primarily wine and the poor buy primarily bread. Assume further that a change in productivity increases the amount of wine and reduces the quantity of bread. Because of these supply changes, wine prices will 45 Following Marshall, Pigou conceived of utility as satisfaction of desire and the intensity of the desire is measured by "the money which a person is prepared to offer for a thing," ARTHUR PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, 4 th Ed., Palgrave Macmillan, (1932) at 11. Later in this paper we discuss his assumption for limiting welfare to economic welfare as he defines it. 46 Id. at 51 ("In actual life, however, the national dividend consists of a number of different sorts of things, the quantities of some of which are liable to increase at the same time that the quantities of others are decreasing. In these circumstances there is no direct means of determining by a physical reference whether the dividend of one period is greater or less than that of another.") 47 Establishing an increase in wealth requires that we weight the goods and services that increased and the goods and services that decreased and then compare them. Pigou shows that using prices in the base year and the subsequent year can lead to contradictory conclusions. decrease and bread prices will increase. In this example, the total prices multiplied by quantities can increase or stays constant. Nonetheless, the real income of the poor has decreased and this could lead to a major decline in welfare. 48 This possibility caused Pigou to conclude that "the national dividend will change in one way from the point of view of a period in which tastes and distribution are of one sort, and in a different way from that of a period in which they are of another sort."
49 Put differently, because GDP growth requires measurement of GDP at two periods of time, the comparison involves two sets of prices, and the resulting measures can give conflicting results. 50 To take account of these issues Pigou advanced the following definition of economic welfare:
It is evident that, provided the dividend accruing to the poor is not diminished, increases in the size of the 48 A similar example can be found in Jules Coleman, "Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization," 8 HOFSTRA L. R. 509, 525-526 ((1980) ("The system of wealth maximization assumes at any given time a set of fixed prices for all commodities. On the basis of the prices at t1 imagine that the principle recommends a shift in legal rules from strict liability to negligence. At t2 the negligence rule is therefore instituted. The changeover in liability rules causes a change in relative prices. At t3 suppose we reevaluate from the wealth maximization point of view the efficiency of strict liability and negligence. It is perfectly plausible to suppose that, in at least some cases, the principle of wealth maximization, given the prices of goods at t3, will recommend a change from negligence to strict liability. The problem is straightforward. Wealth maximization requires and affects prices. Prices must be fixed to employ the principle but employing the principle to recommend structural changes in the law affects prices. aggregate national dividend, if they occur in isolation without anything else whatever happening, must involve increases in economic welfare. 51 Essentially Pigou thought that distribution has to be accounted for before one can conclude that increases in GDP will result in increased welfare. If distribution is allowed to vary, then changes in distribution due to relative price changes (when quantities change in different directions) can reduce welfare, even if wealth measured in existing prices increases.
Pigou also recognized that economic welfare is not restricted to welfare from consumption. Work and leisure are also critical parts of economic decision making that impacts welfare. Pigou included labor and leisure among the factors included in "without anything else whatever happening" in the above quoted definition of welfare. Pigou explained this requirement as follows:
The economic welfare of a community consists in the balance of satisfactions derived from the use of the national dividend over the dissatisfactions involved in the making of it. Consequently, when an increase in the national dividend comes about in association with an increase in the quantity of work done to produce it, the question may be raised whether the increase in work done may not involve dissatisfaction in excess of the satisfaction which its product yields. 52 Indeed, Pigou assumed full employment so that workers trade off leisure and work. Absent this assumption, we would have to account for the welfare impact of involuntary unemployment in addition to the labor/leisure tradeoff. 53 Finally, Pigou was also explicit that welfare can increase as a result of a distributional change alone, independent of the size of the national dividend:
Nevertheless, it is evident that any transference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor 51 Id. at 82. 52 Id. at 85. The findings are in marked contrast with the notion cherished by some economists that unemployment is voluntary so no utility loss is to be expected from being unemployed. All studies using happiness data find that unemployment causes major unhappiness for the persons affected.").
man of similar temperament, since it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. The old 'law of diminishing utility' thus leads securely to the proposition: Any cause which increases the absolute share of real income in the hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in the size of the national dividend from any point of view, will, in general, increase economic welfare.
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Pigou's concluded that welfare can be increased in two ways, (1) if real distribution and tastes are held constant, and work is not adversely effect, an increase in wealth measured in prices will increase welfare, and (2) If income redistribution from rich to poor occurs without impacting total wealth, welfare will also increase. As discussed below Pigou's conclusions cannot be squared with Judge Bork's remarks about welfare and wealth in the Antitrust Paradox. Judge Bork asserts that an increase in wealth increases welfare and regardless of distribution, work effort, or changing tastes.
D. Pareto Optimality
As stated above, Pareto rejected Marshall's assumptions of partial equilibrium and cardinal utility. Instead, Pareto advanced the notion of a "Pareto optimum" which denotes a situation where improvements to some economic agents cannot be accomplished without harming other agents. An equivalent way to say this is that all voluntary trades that benefit both trading parties have been exhausted. If a voluntary trade that is mutually beneficial is still possible then at least one person can still be made better off without harming any other individual. Only when these trades are depleted can the economy be at a Pareto optimum. The Pareto criteria is essentially a criteria of unanimous consent. Economists have identified three necessary conditions for a Pareto optimum. 56 These conditions define what most economists mean by the term "efficiency" as well as the various types of efficiencies. The first condition of a Pareto optimal point is called "allocative efficiency" or "exchange efficiency." An exchange efficiency holds when no voluntary trades among consumers exist that could make some individuals better off with our harming at least one other person. 57 The assumption is that given the distribution of goods and services or ("endowments"), that all mutually beneficial trade is accomplished. The technical condition for an allocative efficient optimum to hold is that all individuals share the same marginal rates of substitution. The marginal rate of substitution is a measure of the rate at which an individual is willing to exchange one good for another, given the amounts each person possesses. Pareto reasoned that if each consumer values each good and service compared to other goods and services in the same way, there would be no incentive for further voluntary trade. 58 The second condition for a Pareto optimum is called "production efficiency." Production efficiency occurs when firms have exhausted all voluntary mutually beneficial trades of inputs. The exhaustion of voluntary trades implies that for one firm to increase output requires that another firm must decrease output. Again the assumption is that factors of production are given and firms exchange from their given endowment of factors. This second condition holds when the "marginal rate of technical substitution" is equal across firms. The marginal rate of technical substitution is the rate at which a firm must replace a unit of one input for another input, given the inputs the firm has already employed and keeping output constant. If all firms have the same marginal rates of technical substitution, then there is no room for further voluntary trade of inputs, and production is efficient. Finally, the third condition for a Pareto optimum is called the "top level efficiency" or "output efficiency." This condition holds when the marginal rate of substitution for individuals equals the marginal rate of technical substitution among firms. This is normally presented to economics students using a production possibility frontier. The production possibility frontier graphs all the 56 The classic and one of the best explanations of these conditions can be found in Francis Bator, "The points where the marginal rates of technical substitution are equal, in other words it displays all of the different combinations of output where production is efficient. When the "top level efficiency" holds, the slope of the production possibility frontier at a point (called the "marginal rate of transformation") is equal to the marginal rate of substitution for individuals. The notion is that if this condition holds society cannot pick a different level of output of each good which would make consumers be better off. Put another way, it means that we cannot increase the production of one good and decrease the production of another good, and then use these amounts as the new endowments and thereby make some individuals better off without harming some other individual or through trade. 59 As Mark Blaug summarizes:
All these conditions may be summed up in the one grand criterion: Between any two goods (products and factors), the subjective and objective marginal rates of substitution must be equal for all households and all production units, respectively, and these subjective and objective ratios must be equal to each other.
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In any economy there is an unlimited number of possible Pareto optimal positions, one for each point on the production possibilities frontier. This is a problem because it means that there are numerous situations where the Pareto criteria can't be used for comparison purposes, because we cannot make judgments between two points that are both Pareto optimal. This limitation motivated subsequent attempts were by Bergson and Samuelson to develop a "social welfare function" that could theoretically rank Pareto optimum positions. Unfortunately, work in this area has not led to any acceptable or realistic solutions. Indeed, these problems make the Pareto approach especially inapplicable for use in antitrust analysis, because there are always losers in antitrust cases. Thus, while Pareto optimality and its associated concepts are sometimes mentioned by Judge Bork, no actual application of the theory to antitrust analysis is feasible.
E. The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
The economics profession has significantly advanced the analysis of general equilibrium begun by Walras and Pareto. None of this mathematical modeling has rendered welfare economics useful or relevant to the work of antitrust lawyers. By way of background, Leon Walras developed the first general equilibrium model of exchange and production in the 1870s. In Walras' model, the known variables included the number of consumers, the number of firms, the initial endowments, consumer preferences, and available production techniques. Consumers were assumed to maximize utility and firms to maximize profits. All prices and outputs were then determined simultaneously in the model by supply and demand taking a large literature (categorized by the term "social choice") that analyzed the robustness of this impossibility result when assumptions are modified. Theorem after theorem demonstrated that nearly all changes in the axiomatic structure left unchanged the result pertaining to dictatorship."); ROBIN HAHNEL AND MICHAEL ALBERT, QUIET REVOLUTION IN WELFARE ECONOMICS, Princeton U.P. (1990) at 21 ("However, attempts to specify a social welfare function or even establish the possibility of a reasonably desirable social welfare function have ended in frustration. All attempts to date to make neoclassical welfare theory a complete theory of social choice have failed to do so despite painstaking work and, in some cases, brilliant insight."). 62 126, 127 (1989) ("A second point is that general equilibrium lacks any result as to the stability or uniqueness of equilibrium that can be derived from the standard assumptions on the endowments, production possibilities and preferences of individuals…Introducing more means that there is no proof that a competitive process, even if it exists, would ever lead to an equilibrium. In these models, if trading is performed at disequilibrium prices (as in real economies) there is no economic theory that guarantees that the economy will reach an equilibrium. I raise this limitation because the Arrow-Debreu proof of the existence of equilibrium has led to the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The first fundamental theorem states that, assuming no externalities, public goods, imperfect information, and other market failures, every competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. The second fundamental theorem states that any Pareto efficient allocation can be attained through the market system using lump sum transfers (transfers the magnitude of which do not depend on variables that the individual can alter).
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Neither of these fundamental theorems appear to be helpful for antitrust analysis. The first theorem merely says that if we attained a perfectly competitive equilibrium (which requires unobtainable conditions) it would be Pareto optimal (which has the two limitations described above). The second fundamental theorem has sometimes been considered more relevant. One interpretation of the second theorem is that it means that any Pareto efficient allocation of resources can be attained by the market. 70 overlooks the fact that stability of a general equilibrium cannot be established. In other words, after altering distribution, the market may never move to a competitive equilibrium. As Frank Ackerman explains the problem:
Consider the process of redistributing initial resources and then letting the market achieve a new equilibrium. Implicitly, this image assumes that the desired new equilibrium is both unique and stable. If the equilibrium is not unique, one of the possible equilibrium points might be more socially desirable than another, and the market might converge toward the wrong one. If the equilibrium is unstable, the market might never reach it, or might not stay there when shaken by small, random events.
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There is no actual theoretical basis for assuming that by establishing free markets and altering distribution one could obtain a desired Pareto optimal situation. In sum, the significant work and advancement in the modeling of general equilibrium and Pareto optimality, has led to a dead end as far as relevance for antitrust analysis. While the Pareto criteria has the advantage of dispensing with cardinal utility and the need for interpersonal utility comparisons, it is basically unworkable for antitrust purposes because it cannot distinguish between an unlimited number of Pareto optimal points and it can't make judgments between situations that involve a loss to any individual. It follows that antitrust decisions about corporate business strategy and market power virtually always involve situations where the Pareto criteria will not apply.
F. John Hicks' Revival of Consumer Surplus
As most of the economics profession gravitated to the Pareto principle, Marshall's concept of consumer surplus was largely forgotten until it was resurrected are complete and perfectly competitive; and (b) it is possible to transfer wealth among consumers in an incentive-neutral or 'lump sum' manner"). 72 In 1943, in response to Robbins, John Hicks was able to reformulate the concept of consumer's surplus on an ordinal basis. To do so he defined the concepts of "compensating variation" (CV") and "equivalent variation" ("EV"). Both concepts are built on purely ordinal utility assumptions. 78 Hicks then showed that consumer's surplus is bounded above and below by these two ordinal concepts. Compensating variation is the maximum amount of money that can be taken from someone and just leave them as well of (on the same indifference curve) as before a price fall, and vice versa for a price rise. Equivalent variation is the minimum amount of money that must be given to someone to make them as well off as before a price fall, and vice versa for a price rise. The consumer surplus will fall somewhere between these two ordinal measures.
Hick's concepts of compensating and equivalent variation can be illustrated using the above graphs. 79 On Figure 1a the consumer begins at point 1 on the indifference curve. 80 Budget line AA, represents the original set of prices. Suppose now that the price of product X decreases. This rotates the budget line to AA' (since X is cheaper the consumer can buy more of X with the same income). At AA' the consumer can reach a higher indifference curve representing more utility and then moves to point 2. BB is the parallel budget line that results when we decrease income just enough so that the consumer is placed back on the original indifference curve. The difference between BB and AA' is AB on the Y axis. AB is the compensating variation defined as the amount of money (assuming Y is money) that the consumer would pay to obtain the price change. Notice that by using CV we evaluate the distance between the indifference curves using the final prices. Figure 1b illustrates the calculation of the equivalent variation. The consumer begins again at point 1. Again, the price of X falls and the budget line rotates from AA to AA'. The consumer moves from point 1 on U1 to point 2 on U2. But now the distance between the indifference curves, or the change in utility, is measured using the original prices. We do this by drawing budget line BB parallel to budget line AA. This gives us BA, which is the utility change but measured at the original prices. This amount can be thought of as the amount of money that the consumer would accept to forego the price reduction.
The consumer surplus must fall somewhere between CV and EV. Consumer surplus must be larger or equal to CV but smaller or equal to EV. Thus, Hicks was able to put an upper and lower boundary on the measurement of consumer surplus, but using only concepts that reply on ordinal utility. In a much quoted article in the antitrust literature, Bobby Willig showed that, in general, consumer surplus is, in fact, a good approximation of either CV or EV.
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In order to conduct antitrust analysis, one must be able to aggregate EV or CV across individuals to obtain market level numbers. Unfortunately, it turns out that we cannot add CVs or EVs in a way that is meaningful. Suppose the Y variable on Figures 1a and 1b represents money. This money cannot be our normal conception of money because money is a cardinal measure. The money that Y represents can only be ordinal money. If Y consists of ordinal dollars, it means we may have different monetary scales for each consumer. For example, one consumer might have a scale based on ten dollar bills, while another consumer uses scale of hundred dollar bills, even though both represent the same amounts of utility. The different money scales also need not have the same starting point. Therefore, EV and CV cannot be aggregated, just as ordinal utility can be aggregated. As such, the concepts that Hicks defined cannot be added to obtain boundaries for the market consumer surplus 81 Even assuming we can find a way to combine CV's or EV's, a further the problem with adding CVs and EVs across consumers is that we have losers and winners. In these situations, there is no way to weight the loss of welfare for the losers against the gain for the winners because we cannot compare the welfare implications of a loss of CV or EV to one consumer against the gain of CV or EV of another individual. It could happen that all the losses from a policy impact the poor while the gains only impact the rich. Obviously, these gains and losses can represent different amounts of utility. Economists sometimes side-step this problem by assuming that "increases in income as equally socially valuable no matter who receives them." 84 Another possible way out of the problem might be to use the compensation principle, discussed below, to say something meaningful about aggregate CVs or EVs. This would require a direct relationship between EV, CV, and the compensation principle. Unfortunately, Robin Boadway demonstrated that no such relationship exists. As he concludes:
All of these discussions neglect the distributional effects of the policy change. That is, changes in aggregate consumer and producer surpluses are simply summed up in monetary units regardless of to whom they accrue (either positively or negatively). The justification usually given for this is that a positive value for the aggregate surplus change indicates that the gainers could compensate the losers for the policy change and still be better off. The analysis of this paper has shown that this 82 One might think that you can simply add compensating variations between individuals. However, this is not the case, because the money metrics means different amounts of utility for different rationale for ignoring distributional effects is not generally valid. That is, obtaining a positive change in aggregate consumers' and producers' surplus is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the satisfaction of a compensation test which involves the hypothetical payment of monetary compensation from the gains to the losers. 85 Thus, absent unrealistic assumptions (addressed in the next section) compensating variation and equivalent variation do not provide a solution to the problem of intercomparability of welfare using ordinal utility.
G. The Compensation Principle
Nicolas Kaldor advanced the "compensation" principle to escape the limitations of Pareto's principle. Recall, Pigou had shown that changes in wealth alone cannot measure welfare without accounting for the welfare impact of changes in distribution. The compensation principle is an effort to separate the issues of production and distribution, and thereby advance something like Pigou's first principle without the distribution qualification. If successful, the criteria could be applied when there are losers. Kaldor's principle was simple, a policy change is welfare improving if the potential gainers can compensate the potential losers and still have some of the gain leftover. The compensation principle was a kin to the Pareto principle, except that actual compensation was not necessary. 86 Kaldor's principle was quickly lauded by John Hicks as a principle that is "universally valid, being applicable to every conceivable type of society." 87 Two years after these words were written, Tibor Scitovsky showed that Kaldor's principle can lead to contradictions, or reversals, where the change from situation A to situation B could satisfy the compensation principle, but then at the new prices in situation B, a move back to situation A also satisfies the compensation principle. 88 To illustrate Samuelson's concern consider point d1 on Figure 2a . Consider next a move from d1 to d2. This move meets the Kaldor-Hicks test because through changes in distribution alone we can move to d'2 which is also on U1. Now compare d'2 and d1. Both A and B can increase utility by moving to d'2 from d1. It follows that a move from d1 to d2 on efficiency grounds alone is an improvement. However, notice the same argument can be made for a move from d2 to d1. At d1 we can move along U1 to d'1 where it is clear that A and B can both increase utility over d2, so the compensation test is also satisfied for the reverse move. Samuelson pointed out that there is always a potential inconsistency whenever there is an intersecting utility possibility curve even if both points that are considered by a policy change are all on one side of the intersection. Consider Figure 2b . A move from d1 to d2 satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks test and no reversal is possible. However, Samuelson pointed out that both A and B could be made better off by simply moving along U1 to point d''1 rather than moving to point d2. Samuelson argued that a consistent compensation test required that U2 be entirely outside of U1, meaning there can't be any intersection anywhere along the utility possibility curves. One utility curve must be above the other along its entire length.
In sum, Samuelson showed that the compensation principle is inconsistent whenever it is possible that utility possibility curves can intersect. 92 This was in 1950. Three years later, in a ground breaking article in 1953, W. M. Gorman proved the necessary conditions in order to ensure that utility curves do not intersect. In his article, he set out the problem as follows:
This is made clear following the discussion of Nicholas Kaldor's attempt to distinguish between problems of efficiency and problems of distribution, and to erect a separate criterion of efficiency. If the utility possibility surfaces cut, this distinction breaks down. The criterion of efficiency comes to depend on distribution. If they do not cut, the distinction can be maintained.
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Gorman then demonstrated that the condition necessary to ensure that the utility curves do not intersect is that "the Engel curves for different individuals at the same prices are parallel straight lines" which means that "an extra unit of purchasing power should be spent in the same way no matter to whom it is given." Under one distribution of commodities we obtain one utility possibility curve, but under a different distribution we obtain another utility possibility curve that could intersect the first. was the parsing of the total Pareto improvement into efficiency and equity parts using the criterion that equity compensations (paid in the numeraire) did not change the size of the social pie (measured using the same numeraire). But this is only what we have called the numeraire illusion: changes in the size of a yardstick cannot be revealed by using that same yardstick. The illusion is that attributes a description based on one numeraire (usually money, or abstractly, 'purchasing power') are misinterpreted as if they were numeraire-invariant attributes of the underlying situation being described").
The basic problem Kaldor set out to solve, to find a measure of efficiency that was independent of distribution, has no satisfactory remedy.
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H. Summary of the "Wisdom" of Welfare Economics for Antitrust Law
Before reviewing Judge Bork's arguments for adoption of consumer welfare as the sole goal of antitrust law, it is useful to summarize the "wisdom" that can be discerned from the giants in the economics field that are responsible for developing the field of welfare economics:
a. Consumer's surplus is a viable measure of consumer welfare if economists could actually measure utility in a cardinal manner. If cardinal utility is observed through money transactions, we also have to know the marginal utility of money for each individual. If we assume partial equilibrium, we further have to know if there are any important effects in interrelated markets. b. Increased wealth, defined as GDP in market prices, is not necessarily coextensive with increased welfare. When some goods increase and others decrease, it impacts real distribution which then can have an independent impact on welfare. c. Pareto Optimality has the advantage that it does not rely on cardinal utility and assumes that interpersonal comparison of utility is impossible. Unfortunately, it cannot evaluate situations where there are winners and losers. This renders it inapplicable to Antitrust Law. d. Consumer's surplus can be measured using only ordinal utility. However, in this case, we lose the ability to add utility functions. Since antitrust law is concerned with markets, this drawback makes consumer surplus measured using compensating and equivalent variation inappropriate for antitrust law. e. The Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle has been shown to be unreliable except in situations where utility possibility curves do not intersect. We can be sure that no such intersections exist only under highly unrealistic assumptions. The basic underlying problem is that efficiency and distribution (equity) cannot be separated in neoclassical welfare theory.
It is readily apparent that the history of welfare economics should have given antitrust lawyers pause before accepting Judge Bork's rendition of "consumer welfare" that has been his legacy. The consumer welfare standard was accepted for its conservative implications, not for its rigor.
II. Judge Bork on Consumer Welfare
We are now in a position to apply the wisdom of the welfare economists to Judge Bork's original claim that "consumer welfare" is, and should be, the sole goal of the antitrust laws. The most extensive discussion by Judge Bork on this topic is contained in Chapters 4 and 5 of the Antitrust Paradox.
100 It is therefore important to examine these two chapters carefully.
I. Judge Bork's Introduction to the Concept of Consumer Welfare
In Chapter 4, Judge Bork introduces the concept of consumer welfare. I quote from his chapter at length because it highlights the jumble of welfare concepts Judge Bork presents. In the opening paragraph Judge Bork says, "An understanding of the relationship of that behavior [business behavior] to consumer well-being can be gained only through basic economic theory." What follows is the definition of "consumer welfare" Judge Bork claims originates from his understanding of economics:
Consumer welfare is greatest when society's economic resources are allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as technological constraints permit. Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for the wealth of the nation. Antitrust thus, has a built-in preference for material prosperity, but it has nothing to say about the ways prosperity is distributed or used. Those are matters for other laws. Consumer welfare, as the term is used in antitrust, has no sumptuary or ethical component, but permits consumers to define by their expression of wants in the marketplace what things they regard as wealth.
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In the passage above, Judge Bork avers that "consumer welfare is greatest when society's economic resources are allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as technological constraints permit." How should we understand this sentence? On its face it appears to say that economic resources are distributed so to maximize utility. Such an interpretation requires that we assume the existence of cardinal utility, and that the marginal utility of money is constant. If these assumptions were made explicit, lawyers and judges would likely reject Judge Bork's consumer welfare as unreliable. In the alternative, Judge Bork may mean simply that consumer welfare is greatest at a Pareto optimum where all voluntary trades are exhausted. In this case, consumer welfare would have such limited applicability it would lack relevance. It is hard to know which interpretation is correct because we are not told what Judge Bork intends by the words "maximize utility." Regardless of the interpretation, consumer welfare isn't maximized, utility is, implying that individual utility derived from producer activities and other life activities are relevant. Thus, this first sentence has no obvious consistent meaning.
In the next sentence, Judge Bork explains that "consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for the wealth of the nation." This statement directly contradicts Pigou's analysis and the attendant literature.
102 Judge Bork follows with "Antitrust thus, has a built-in preference for material prosperity, but it has nothing to say about the ways prosperity is distributed or used." This is again contrary the findings of welfare economists. Judge Bork simply asserts, without evidence, that such a separation has been shown to be possible and consistent. Indeed, he concedes this a few pages later when he says, "Efficiency is at bottom a value concept not a description of mechanical or engineering operation." 103 By "value" one must assume he means "utility" which depends on ability to purchase goods and services, which in Judge Bork rhetorically asks the reader to consider how efficiency relates to antitrust enforcement. He answers that "The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare." The words "allocative efficiency" and "productive efficiency" are evocative of Pareto's theory. In this context, improving allocative efficiency would not impact issues like market power, because trades are limited to those that do not harm the monopolist, which undermines the usefulness of this interpretation for Judge Bork. Instead, he may have in mind a description of the Williamson model that he addresses in Chapter 5. If this is the case he is seamlessly moving between Pareto and Marshall with no understanding of the profound theoretical differences between the two approaches.
J. Judge Bork's Description of Consumer's Surplus
Despite the introductory confusion, as chapter 4 unfolds Judge Bork begins to track Marshall's analysis, introducing readers to the concept of consumer's surplus. The consumer's surplus is the area below the demand curve but above the price. The area is expressed in units of dollars, which assumes cardinal utility and a constant marginal utility of money. While Marshall makes his assumptions explicit, Judge Bork is silent in this regard. The chapter further explains that the area between the MC (supply curve) and the prevailing price is the measure of producer surplus. The supply curve represents how much a producer would be willing to produce at each price. The standard explanation for a rising supply curve is that as prices rise producers increase their profit margins, which in turn causes a movement of resources within the firm to production of the higher margin product.
105 Judge
Bork doesn't recognize here that Marshall's supply curve is based on costs and are not a part of welfare analysis.
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K. Judge Bork's Analysis of the Williamson Diagram
In Chapter 5 of the Antitrust Paradox, Judge Bork endorses the well-known Williamson diagram of the static impact of a merger. Interestingly, Judge Bork refers to this figure as the "consumer welfare diagram." This has been a source of confusion because the diagram introduced in chapter 5 clearly contains both consumer's surplus and producer's surplus, collectively, referred to by Judge Bork as consumer welfare. 105 It is hard to square this story with the assumptions of perfect competition. If all markets consist of numerous small price taking firms, why are input prices rising? Judge Bork's explanation is as follows: "We infer a rising cost curve from the existence of more than one firm, since if marginal costs were level or declining, the firm would continually increase its rate of output until it occupied the entire industry." This is not a satisfying explanation. It merely means that "facts" have to be adjusted to maintain the consistency of a theory that we favor. There has been a long controversy concerning the theoretical consistency of Marshall's use of a rising supply curve. Marshall argued that supply must increase because of the existence of a fixed factor of production. Piero Sraffa argued that this raised several inconsistencies for perfect competition. Piero Sraffa, " The first thing to notice is that the Williamson model is a model of a market, not an individual. The demand curve is the market demand curve. The average cost curves are representative of the market, but only the merging parties' costs are assumed to be impacted. Prior to the merger the market is competitive and the consumer's surplus in the market is the area below the demand curve but above Pc. Once the merger occurs, the new entity raises price to Pm and reduces output from Qc to Qm. However, the merger also results in a cost savings because the marginal or average cost falls from MC1 to MC2. Thus, mergers involve a tradeoff. 107 As Judge
Bork describes, the model "compares the 'dead-weight loss' (the amount above costs that consumers would be willing to pay for the lost output) to the gains to all consumers of cost reduction resulting from the merger. Cost reductions mean that the saved resources are freed to produce elsewhere in the economy."
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Judge Bork does not seem to notice that the Williamson model combines incompatible units of analysis. To see why, notice that the illustrated merger results in a loss of consumer surplus because the price increases from Pc to Pm. This implies that some utility has been lost to individuals participating in this market. To get this result Bork must again employ the Marshallian assumptions that (1) cardinal utility is measurable because we aggregate individual demand curve to obtain the market demand curve, (2) utility is measured in money and a constant marginal utility of money prevails, and (3) we assume no other market is impacted by the merger. Now consider the cost side of the merger. Costs decrease from MC1 to MC2 resulting in an increase in profits. These units are dollars that can be found on the income statement of the firm. They are not a direct monetary expression of utility as was assumed on the consumer side. However, for welfare analysis only utility counts. Marshall was aware of this problem, but Judge Bork is not. When introducing the supply price Marshall wrote:
The simplest case of balance or equilibrium between desire and effort is found when a person satisfies one of his wants by his own direct work. When a boy picks blackberries for his own eating, the action of picking is probably itself pleasurable for a while; and for some time longer the pleasure of eating is more than enough to repay the trouble of picking. But after he has eaten a good deal, the desire for more diminishes; while the task of picking begins to cause weariness, which may indeed be a feel of monotony rather than of fatigue. Equilibrium is reached when at last his eagerness to play and his disinclination for the work of picking counterbalance the desire for eating. The satisfaction which he can get from picking fruit has arrived at its maximum: for up to that time every fresh picking has added more to his pleasure than it has taken away; and after that time any further picking would take away from his pleasure more than it would add.
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If the Williamson model was a measure of the utility from consumption plus the corresponding additional utility gained in production from the merger, the model would be consistent. But this is not the case. A lower average cost is not coextensive with producer utility. When merging parties' lower costs it is often the result of greater effort by labor or the result of cost saving layoffs. Both cases create disutility, not utility. One is hard pressed to credibly contend that increased labor hours, or greater unemployment improves welfare. The Williamson model assumes without any basis that the private profits of the monopolist are welfare increasing if they are not a result of a price increase. 110 This assumption favors the interests of big business over employee interests for no good reason.
L. Area B in Figure 4: The Income Transfer between the Consumers and the Monopolist
Judge Bork next contends that the income distribution effect, or the transfer of income from the consumers who do not switch to other substitutes, which is area B in Figure 4 , is not important for antitrust purposes. Judge Bork's reasoning is that the monopolist and the end consumers should be collectively considered as part of the consumer class. As he says, "Those who continue to buy after a monopoly is formed pay more for the same output, and that shifts income from them to the monopoly and its owners, who are also consumers." 111 Robert Lande has been most outspoken in challenging Judge Bork conclusion. He has argued that the reason Congress did not want monopolists to raise prices is precisely because of this income transfer. According to Lande, Congress wanted to establish a property right in the competitive price. Thus, he distinguishes between consumers who purchase goods and services and the firms with market power that produce and sell them. His argument is simply that Congress wanted to prevent the transfer of income from one group to the other. Professor Lande's analysis is open to the question why society should care about income transfers between monopolists and others? What overall social goal is being advanced? One such goal is simply to prevent the negative social consequences from income inequality. 112 In 1890, the "trusts" represented a small group of large advanced firms while over 90% of the population was agricultural workers, blue-collar workers and service workers. 113 It makes sense that a Congressman or Senator in 1890, representing one of these groups would view the issue of higher prices as one of distribution between classes or segments of classes. 114 Judge Bork next takes up the argument raised by Judge Posner that the income transfer or monopoly profits are deadweight losses because they are spent unproductively trying to achieve the monopoly in the first place. 115 Judge Bork correctly rejects this view, but for the wrong reason. 116 Judge Bork argues that any costs of achieving a monopoly are "wasted and may be added to the dead-weight loss." 117 This is not true. There is no basis in welfare economics for treating an income transfer as a cost. Suppose a firm achieves monopoly power through extensive use of advertising. We cannot transform the revenues of the advertising industry into a cost. The reason is that the "value" of the advertising revenue is based on consumer demand, like any other market. Put another way, the advertising contracts were the result of voluntary exchange, which by their nature are Pareto improving. The same logic would apply to lobbyists, the legal profession, or any other services that aid in achieving monopoly power. There are no coherent grounds to label goods and services that are demanded (and thereby satisfy preferences) as "wasted." Neoclassical economics does not allow one to look behind preferences and classify some goods and services "waste" and others as "value" based on the purpose of the preferences. 118 As Michael Mandler observes "contemporary economics relinquishes any attempt to specify the motives underlying choice. Preference itself is now the primitive element of consumer theory; there is no need to peer into agents' psyches." Even if one were to accept Judge Bork's conclusion that in 1890 Congress intended to adopt consumer welfare as its legislative goal, it is unlikely that Congress would have adopted Judge Bork's unsupportable interpretation of welfare economics. It is more likely that Congress did not intend to rely on welfare economics at all. Indeed, 1890 the year the Sherman Act was signed into law was also the year that Alfred Marshall first introduced the concept of consumer's surplus to English speaking audiences. In the United States, at the turn of the century, American economists were largely institutional economists that rejected neoclassical welfare economics. The American institutionalists focused on empirical factual analysis and for the most part opposed abstract theoretical constructs like consumer's surplus or utility. 120 Most American economists also opposed the Sherman Act on the grounds that large firms were subject to "ruinous competition" and cartels were a rational market response to this phenomena. 121 The views of the American economists at the time had empirical support. Large firms in the 1880s had broken down traditional geographic market barriers, but produced largely homogeneous products that competed exclusively on price. 122 Throughout the late 19 th century in the United States, the corporate profit rate fell and there were declining industrial prices. 123 It was not until the 1920s that the advertising revolution led to the prevalence of branding of heterogeneous products that the "ruinous competition" problem was put to rest. Judge Bork's legislative arguments assume that when Congressman used the words "free competition," or sought to "prevent higher prices," they meant to import the theory of welfare economics.
124 Judge Bork is correct that the legislative history reveals concern about rising prices, but he goes too far when he suggests:
Though the economist of our day would describe the problem of concern to Sherman differently, as a misallocation of resources brought about by a restriction of output rather than one of high prices, there is no monopolies can be given an efficiency interpretation. For example, the common law prohibition on monopolies in the production of the necessities of life prevents market power in goods with low elasticity where dead weight loss would be low, but no prohibition on monopolization of goods with higher elasticities where dead weight loss would be larger.
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An efficiency rule would have prohibited the monopolization of goods with the higher elasticities, not the lower.
Thomas Hazlett has also challenged Judge Bork's assertion that the 51 st Congress that passed the Sherman Act was concerned with consumer welfare, and dead-weight loss by examining other bills passed by the same Congressional individuals:
It is at this point that we should seek out some evidence to separate these competing interpretations of the Sherman Act [Bork v. Learned Hand] . Fortuitously, Sherman and the 51 st Congress provide just such an issue to serve as a test: 'The most important measure adopted during this Congress' wrote Sherman in his autobiography, 'was what was popularly known as the McKinley Tariff Law'. Passed on October 1, 1890, the tariff was 'a matter of constant debate in both houses' between 1883 and 1890, as opposed to the monopoly law, which came and went with little discussion. Whatever cross-currents were evidenced in the analysis of the trust question, the tariff was then well understood as a restriction of output resulting from dead-weight loss. 132 Hazlett's point is simply that it would make little sense to pass the Sherman Act if its aim was to reduce dead weight loss, and then pass the McKinley Tariff in the same year which would increase dead weight loss by raising import prices. In sum, Judge Bork's case for congressional intent to pass a statute based on consumer welfare is unavailing. He presents a contradictory discourse to explain consumer welfare and his legislative evidence is thin at best. Nonetheless, he is probably the most highly cited scholar in antitrust. 
Conclusions
There is evidence of a sea change in antitrust scholarship. As Daniel Crane demonstrates in a recent paper, both liberal and conservative scholars have begun to reject the narrow goals ushered in by Judge Bork in the late 1970s. 133 The New
Brandeisian criticism focuses on how enforcement driven by the consumer welfare standard has been inadequate and has resulted in serious economic concerns. 134 These concerns were recently summarized in a Council of Economic Advisor's report in 2016 authored by Jason Furman. Furman shows that if one compares the economic situation in the United States before 1980 when antitrust enforcement was strong, with the weaker enforcement period dominated by the consumer welfare goal after 1980, one finds several significant changes. Furman shows that in the later period concentration was higher, there was less entry, job creation declined, wages declined, and real investment declined among other changes. 135 While I would argue that these changes are part of a broader evolution of the U.S. economy after 1980, the correlation between these economic problems and Judge Bork's consumer welfare policy is stark. What the consumer welfare standard plausibly did was to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to raise, and judges to consider, the broader economic implications of changes in business practices. 136 The goal of consumer welfare narrowed the inquiry that courts thought permissible when evaluating antitrust cases. If one follows Judge Bork, a court should consider only the impact of the challenged conduct on immediate prices to consumers, but even in this case, the court can consider the offsetting impact of raising corporate profits (Judge Bork's efficiency). This paper has not considered the effects of Judge Bork's influence on antitrust policy. That will be addressed in Part II of this project. Instead, the goal of this paper was to show that Judge Bork never offered a coherent goal for antitrust in the first place. Judge Bork's actual explanation of what he means by "consumer welfare" is unclear and contradictory. In particular, Judge Bork seems unaware that
